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Comments
Railroad Liability for Fires in Louisiana
The liability of a railroad for the damage resulting from a
fire caused by its operation is determined in accordance with
the ordinary principles of tort law. Plaintiff carries the burden
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that some part
of the railroad's operation was conducted negligently and that
this negligence caused the damage for which he seeks reparation.1
In many instances the evidence employed to establish that the
railroad's operation caused the fire may also serve to establish
1. Edrington v. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 96, 6 So. 19 (1889);
Meyer v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 639, 6 So. 218 (1889).
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the railroad's negligence. It is probably for this reason that satis-
factory proof of cause is often said to place upon the defendant
railroad the burden of exonerating itself.2 Such statements, while
open to criticism, reflect actual practice very accurately. 3
The questions presenting the greatest difficulty in this field
of tort liability concern proof of the causal relation between the
railroad's operation and the occurrence of the fire.
The Causal Relation
Plaintiff must prove that the sparks or embers which caused
the fire were emitted during the negligent railroad operation.4
Plaintiff is sometimes able to prove this by the testimony of eye
witnesses.5 Usually, however, he must rely upon some form of
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may relate to the time
elapsing between the passage of the train and the appearance of
the fire, the adequacy of the railroad's spark-arresting equipment,
or the trainmen's method of operating the engine. The safety
history of the railroad with regard to fires, weather conditions,
and the absence of other assignable causes of the fire are also
relevant.
Time elapsing between passage of train and appearance of
fire. The length of the period between the passage of a locomo-
tive and the appearance of a fire affects the plausibility of the
inference that the railroad's operation started the fire. But the
element of time, while it may strengthen this inference, will not
alone justify it.6 For instance, the mere occurrence of a fire in a
2. Lemann Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 1089, 55 So. 684 (1911); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 Fed. 917 (E.D. La. 1890).
3. For a discussion of burden of proof in Louisiana, see Malone, Res
Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases,
4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70, 84 (1941).
4. Fuller v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 69 So. 804 (1915).
5. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 Fed. 917 (E.D. La. 1890) (wit-
ness saw engine emit sparks which rose fifty feet, and were carried one
hundred feet); Givens v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 176 La. 796, 798, 146 So. 751 (1933)
(witness said "a number of sparks" were emitted and five minutes after
train passed, grass was seen burning on edge of right-of-way); Bowie Lum-
ber Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R.R. & S.S., 154 La. 407, 410, 97 So. 591,
592 (1923) ("Locomotive emitted sparks about the size of a buckshot or pea");
Haas v. Hines, 150 La. 599, 91 So. 58 (1922) (cinders were heard rattling on
tin roof as train passed); Palmetto Moss Factory v. Texas & P. Ry., 145 La.
555, 563, 82 So. 700, 703 (1919) ("live cinders were thrown as the train passed,
some of which fell on and burned the clothes and flesh of persons farther
away even than the moss factory"); Tortorice v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 142
La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917) (witnesses saw sparks falling on shingle roof as
train passed); Edrington v. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 96, 98,
6 So. 19, 20 (1889) (train emitted sparks "as large as the end of the thumb").
6. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 802, 126 So. 64,
66 (1930) (fire broke out "immediately" after train passed over right-of-way
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building a few minutes after a train has passed cannot, by itself,
support the conclusion that the fire was caused by the railroad.7
The time factor may also be employed by the defendant to show
that the fire could not have been caused by sparks emitted by its
engine because the period of time between the passage of the
train and the occurrence of the fire was either too brief s or too
long.9
Adequacy of the spark-arresting equipment. The probability
is great that an engine operated with a faulty spark arrester emits
sparks. With this in view, the courts have resolved the issue of
cause in favor of the plaintiff when railroad engines have been
equipped with spark arresters incapable of preventing the emis-
sion of dangerous sparks, 10 or equipped with none at all." The
causal relation has also been established by showing that railroad
employees handled spark-arresting equipment carelessly. 12 Con-
versely, proof that the railroad equipped its engines with ade-
quate spark arresters usually weakens the inference that the fire
was caused by the railroad.'8
filled with dry grass, weeds and debris, in dry, windy weather); Lemann Co.
v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 1089, 1092, 55 So. 684, 685 (1911) ("train had passed
only a very short while before the fire," previous fires had occurred under
similar circumstances); Thomason v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 122 La. 995,
1005, 48 So. 432, 435 (1909) (fire occurred "a short time" after a locomotive
emitting sparks passed the building).
7. Dudley v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 133 La. 80, 62 So. 413 (1913) (fire
occurred one and one-half minutes after newly overhauled and inspected
engine had passed).
8. Ibid. (sacks of rice, known to burn slowly, were "blazing" one and
one-half minutes after train had passed).
9. In Coats v. Texas & P. Ry., 168 La. 815, 817, 123 So. 335, 336 (1929) the
court said: "If we accept the theory that sparks were blown by the wind
from the pile of burning ties on the right of way, it seem incredible that
any sparks should have ignited the bagging ... near the buildings and
should have remained dormant from 11 a.m. to 12:20 a.m. [the next day]";
Bowie Lumber Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R.R. & S.S., 154 La. 407, 97 So.
591 (1923) (dry cypress boards, which burn rapidly, caught fire one hour
after train passed).
10. Bowie Lumber Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R.R. & S.S., 154 La.
407, 97 So. 591 (1923) (locomotive had jagged hole in spark arrester near
smoke stack).
11. Davis v. Natchez, Red River & Texas R.R., Gunby's Dec. 95 (La.
App. 1885) (engine was operated without a spark arrester and used wood
as fuel while emitting "an unusual volume of large sparks").
12. Easterly v. Natalbany Lumber Co., 171 La. 459, 131 So. 298 (1930)
(employees dumped large quantities of live coals from ash pan).
13. In Laurel Hill Gin & Mfg. Co. v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 149 La. 224,
225, 88 So. 801 (1921), the Supreme Court said: "Perhaps the supposition that
the fire was started by sparks from the locomotive would be the most plausi-
ble theory of the origin of the fire, if defendant had not proven that the
locomotive was equipped with a standard spark arrester, in good condition,
and that nothing was done with the engine to cause it to throw sparks an
extraordinary distance when it passed the ginhouse."
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Method of operation. The manner in which trainmen operate
an engine may afford evidence that the train caused the fire. The
courts have found that fire escaped from an engine where the
engineer made a "flying switch,"'14 where he ran the engine at
high speeds on a right-of-way filled with combustibles,", and
where firemen put on extra fuel while passing a building.16 Such
practices naturally increase the fire hazard which may already
exist by reason of high winds, 17 dry weather, 8 or the proximity
of exposed property to the right-of-way. 19
Safety history of the railroad. Evidence of the previous oc-
currence of fires along the right-of-way under conditions similar
to those present in a given case is relevant and admissible 2 to
establish that the railroad operation caused the fire. Plaintiffs
have made effective use of such evidence, especially when un-
usually hazardous railroad operations have already forced prop-
erty owners to take precautions against the emission of dangerous
sparks.2' Even evidence that a particular engine was known to
emit dangerous sparks has been held admissible.22
The effect of wind conditions. The direction and the velocity
of wind, though not conclusive, are relevant in establishing the
causal relation between railroad sparks and the fire. The courts
have considered such evidence in determining the particular
14. Fuller v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 1001, 69 So. 804, 806
(1915) (train was engaged in a "flying switch" which caused "a violent
exhaust of steam and a profuse emission of sparks and live cinders .. ").
15. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 802, 126 So.
64, 66 (1930) (fire started on right-of-way filled with dry grass, weeds, and
debris, after train passed "pulling hard, puffing, and blowing").
16. Tortorice v. Yazoo & m.V.R.R., 142 La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917) (firemen
put on extra fuel while passing plaintiff's building, thereby increasing the
volume of sparks which witnesses saw falling on shingle roof).
17. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 802, 126 So.
64, 66 (1930) (train passed "pulling hard, puffing, and blowing" while heavy
wind was blowing toward plaintiff's property, twenty feet away).
18. Fuller v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 69 So. 804 (1915) (train
made "flying switch" during hot, dry season with wind blowing cinders to-
ward building).
19. Tortorice v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 142 La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917) (firemen
put on extra fuel as engine passed building sixty-five feet away).
20. Lemann Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 1089, 55 So. 684 (1911).
21. Lemann Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 1089, 1091, 55 So. 684, 685
(1911) (railroad operation became so hazardous that some of the buildings
along the right-of-way "had been roofed with iron sheeting to protect them
from fire from passing engines").
22. Haas v. Hines, 150 La. 599, 91 So. 58 (1922); Lemann Co. v. Texas &
P. Ry., 128 La. 1089, 1091, 55 So. 684, 685 (1911) (sparks "were being constantly
emitted").
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direction in which a fire spread,23 as well as in cases involving the
previous occurrence of fires on the same side of the right-of-
way.24 When, because of drought or proximity to exposed prop-
erty, railroad operation is particularly hazardous, wind has been
an important element in the proof of cause.25 When stronger
evidence is present in the case, however, the wind factor plays
a relatively minor role.
26
The effect of dry weather. Since dry weather conditions
tend to create a fire hazard, evidence of such conditions supports
the inference that a fire was caused by the railroad. This is
particularly true when there exists no explanation for its oc-
currence other than the railroad operation.27 On the other hand,
when the engine is equipped with a proper spark arrester, and
there is no evidence pointing to the emission of sparks, the
element of dryness may be effectively employed by defendant to
suggest the existence of other assignable causes of the fire.2 8 In
denying recovery, the courts have frequently emphasized the
probable existence of such causes, especially when evidence that
the railroad started the fire is slight. Thus, it seems that the
23. Luikart v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 150 La. 615, 91 So. 64 (1922) (path of
fire was triangular in shape, indicating that wind had fanned the fire, which
started at apex of triangle, toward burned premises); Luikart v. Yazoo &
M.V.R.R., 148 La. 349, 86 So. 894 (1921) (fire started in hayfield ten minutes
after train passed, and spread to barn fanned by strong wind blowing from
track toward barn).
24. Walker Mercantile Co. v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 152 La. 1052, 95 So. 219
(1922) (building burned, after three fires had occurred on same side of track,
within two miles of burned premises, when wind was blowing in same direc-
tion).
25. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 802, 126 So.
64, 66 (1930) (train was "pulling hard, puffing and blowing" during a dry
season, twenty feet from building, with heavy wind blowing toward plain-
tiff's premises); Fuller v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 69 So. 804
(1915) (engineer made a "flying switch" during dry season with wind blow-
ing toward exposed property; wind blew cinders onto shingle roof).
26. Kentwood Lumber Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 65 F.2d 663 (5th Cir.
1933) (court found that cause of fire was dairy boiler smokestack which
emitted sparks, although wind was blowing toward the dairy, not the burned
premises).
27. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 126 So. 64
(1930) (right-of-way was filled with dry grass, weeds and debris; fire started
on right-of-way after train passed); Walker Mercantile Co. v. Yazoo &
M.V.R.R., 152 La. 1052, 95 So. 219 (1922) (fire started in yard covered with
dry sawdust); Luikart v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 150 La. 615, 91 So. 64 (1922) (dry
hay was ignited in field after railroad employees were seen burning grass
on right-of-way adjacent to field); Luikart v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 148 La.
349, 86 So. 894 (1921) (dry hay in field was ignited after train passed).
28. United Lands Co. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 171 La. 542, 544, 131
So. 664, 665 (1930) (during "unprecedented dry season" fire started in swamp
three hundred feet from burned property); Bowie Lumber Co. v. Morgan's
Louisiana & T.R.R. & S.S., 154 La. 407, 97 So. 591 (1923) (during dry season,
dry cypress lumber caught fire one hour after train passed; it was proved
that dry cypress rarely smoulders, but bursts readily into flames).
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possible existence of other assignable causes of a fire has been
employed as additional support for the courts' conclusions and
not as the basis for them.
Negligence of the Railroad
Plaintiff must prove that the operation which caused the
fire was negligently conducted. In railroad fire cases, negligence
has usually been associated with either the railroad's use of
faulty equipment or the careless management of equipment.
The best equipment cannot entirely prevent the escape of
sparks from a coal-burning steam engine. For this reason, one
Louisiana decision indicates that the installation of equipment
conforming to the generally accepted standard of safety within
the railroad industry discharges the railroad's duty in regard to
safety equipment.2 9 This view is consistent with the "approved
appliances in general use" standard applied in other jurisdic-
tions.30 There is, however, some authority for the contrary view
that evidence of conformity to one standard does not necessarily
show the impracticability of maintaining a higher one, since the
generally accepted standard may not be a reasonably safe one.3 1
The operation of an engine without a spark arrester violates
both the ordinary standard of reasonable care and specific
statutes.32 On the other hand, proof of the adequacy of the spark
arrester is generally a good defense. A number of cases indicate
that such proof is a complete defense, but in these cases, plain-
tiff's evidence of causal relation was weak.3 3 In other cases,
where evidence of cause was strong, the court has considered the
emission of sparks conclusive proof that the spark arrester was
inadequate.34 This has resulted in a conflict in the decisions
which, however, seems more apparent than real.
29. Haas v. Hines, 150 La. 599, 91 So. 58 (1922); Gumbel v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 48 La. Ann. 1180, 20 So. 703 (1896).
30. The cases in other jurisdictions are collected in Note, 68 A.L.R.
1400, 1421 (1930).
31. MORRIS ON TORTS c. 5, § 5 (1953).
32. LA. R.S. 56:1480, 1495 (1950).
33. Laurel Hill Gin & Mfg. Co. v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 149 La. 224, 88 So.
801 (1921); Gumbel v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 48 La. Ann. 1180, 20 So. 703 (1896);
Meyer v. Vicksburg, S. & P.R.R., 41 La. Ann. 639, 6 So. 218 (1889).
34. In Palmetto Moss Factory v. Texas & P. Ry., 145 La. 555, 564, 82 So.
700, 703 (1919), the court said: "If a properly equipped engine could not have
started the fire in the manner in which . . . the evidence shows this one to
have been started, this one undoubtedly must have been faulty." (Italics
supplied.) Luikart v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 148 La. 349, 86 So. 894 k1921); Tor-
torice v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 142 La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917); Fuller v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 69 So. 804 (1915).
[VOL. XV
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Even if a railroad installs satisfactory equipment, the care-
less management of that equipment may constitute negligence.3 5
For instance, the courts have found negligence in "firing" an
engine during a dry season, 36 in "firing" an engine while pulling
a load uphill near exposed property,7 and in operating an engine
so that it is "puffing and blowing" dangerous sparks onto property
twenty feet away.m Similarly, evidence of trainmen's failure to
take extra precautions when the hazard of operation has been
increased by high winds, 39 dry weather,40 or proximity to exposed
property 41 has served to prove the railroad's negligence as well
as to establish the causal relation. Again, causing a profuse
emission of sparks by burning wood in an engine has been held
to constitute negligence. 42
Louisiana courts, like those of other jurisdictions, have de-
cided a number of cases involving railroad liability for fire
damage arising from unusual situations. Some of these suggest
the extent of railroad liability for damage caused by fires started
by third persons. Thus a railroad whose employees failed to take
precautions against a fire started by a mob was held liable for
the resulting destruction of goods in transit on the railroad.48
In another case, plaintiff recovered from the railroad the value
of two carloads of rice destroyed by a fire caused by the acci-
dental mixing of flood water with unslaked lime in another car.44
In one decision plaintiff was denied recovery when a locomotive
blocked a street for "a few minutes," thereby delaying a fire
engine on its way to plaintiff's burning home; however, the
court's opinion makes it clear that recovery was denied only
because the brief delay was found not to have caused the damage
complained of.45 In a somewhat different type of case, a railroad
35. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 Fed. 917 (E.D. La. 1890).
36. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 126 So. 64
(1930).
37. Tortorice v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 142 La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917).
38. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 126 So. 64
(1930).
39. Ibid. (train passed "pulling hard, puffing, and blowing" while heavy
wind was blowing toward plaintiff's property twenty feet away).
40. Fuller v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 137 La. 997, 69 So. 804 (1915) (train
made "flying switch" during hot, dry season, with wind blowing cinders
toward building).
41. Tortorice v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 142 La. 229, 76 So. 620 (1917) (firemen
put on extra fuel as engine passed building sixty-five feet away).
42. Davis v. Natchez, Red River and Texas R.R., Gunby's Dec. 95 (La.
App. 1885).
43. Japhet & Co. v. Southern Ry., 8 La. App. 706 (1927).
44. National Rice Milling Co. v. N.O. & N.E.R.R., 132 La. 615, 61 So. 708
(1913).
45. Boutte v. Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R.R. & S.S., 157 La. 799,
103 So. 158 (1925).
1954]
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was held liable for damage to a parked car caused by the collision
of two other vehicles, whose drivers had been blinded by dense
smoke from a brush fire on the railroad's right-of-way. 46
Railroad liability for fires is not always based upon negli-
gence. For example, in one case a fire of unknown origin in a
railroad car threatened defendant's depot. In an effort to save
the building, the car was moved, causing the destruction of plain-
tiff's property.47 The court based liability not on negligence but
upon what one writer refers to as "incomplete privilege."4
Contributory Negligence
As a general rule, a landowner may act on the assumption
that a railroad will not negligently start a fire on his property.
For this reason, if he takes precautions against the normal
dangers incident to the prudent operation of a railroad, he is not
guilty of contributory negligence. 49 Thus, one case states that
the failure of a landowner to plow a "fire guard" on his land
adjacent to a railroad right-of-way did not constitute contribu-
tory negligence.50 Yet, a lessee of a cotton gin was held guilty
of contributory negligence in spreading loose cotton on a plat-
form to dry forty-four feet from a railroad track,51 while the
owner of the gin was allowed recovery for his loss when the fire
spread to his gin." The test for contributory negligence there-
fore seems to be whether or not the owner's property is so near
to the right-of-way as to be endangered by even a prudently
operated locomotive.5  There is, however, a dearth of Louisiana
cases on this subject, and the result reached in any given case
would seem to depend upon the application of the general
principles of the law of torts.
William C. Hollier
46. Graham v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 54 So.2d 822 (La. App. 1951).
47. Latta v. New Orleans & N.W. Ry., 131 La. 272, 59 So. 250 (1912).
48. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 614 (1926); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 263 (1934). In Latta v. New Orleans & N.W. Ry., 131 La. 272, 279, 281, 284,
59 So. 250, 252, 253, 254 (1912), the court said: "[T]he judgment for plaintiff
is based on the proposition that defendant had no right to sacrifice plaintiff's
property in order to save its own .... [Pllaintiff is entitled to recover upon
the grounds that defendant had no right, legal or moral, to destroy his
property in order to save its own. . . . it cannot be denied that . . . it
[defendant] was more at fault than plaintiff and hence that, agreeably to
a well-recognized rule, being the least innocent of two innocent sufferers ...
it should bear the loss."
49. The leading case is LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Mi. & St. P. Ry.,
232 U.S. 340 (1914).
50. Ellis v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 169 La. 797, 126 So. 64
(1930).
51. Haas v. Hines, 150 La. 599, 91 So. 58 (1922).
52. Ibid.
53. See note 49 supra.
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